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COMMENTS




Congress enacted the National Environmental Policy Act' (NEPA) to
"declare a national policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable
harmony between man and his environment."2 Since its passage, there
have been numerous attempts to determine the scope of NEPA's extra-
territorial reach,3 but due to the vagueness of the statute, the question is
far from settled.4 "Extraterritoriality is essentially . . . a jurisdictional
concept concerning the authority of a nation to adjudicate the rights of
particular parties and to establish the norms of conduct applicable to
events or persons outside its borders."'
The general presumption is that "unless a contrary intent appears,
[statutes are] meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States."6 This is "based on the assumption that Congress is pri-
1. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1988)).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988).
3. See infra part II.A-F, H.
4. Compare Greenpeace U.S.A. v. Stone, 748 F. Supp. 749, 759 (D. Haw. 1990)
("NEPA's legislative history illuminates nothing in regard to extraterritorial application."
(quoting National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 647
F.2d 1345, 1367 (D.C. Cir. 1981)) and Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 772 F.
Supp. 1296, 1297 (D.D.C. 1991) ("The Court cannot ferret out a clear expression of Con-
gress' intention that NEPA should apply beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States.") with Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 536 (D.C. Cir.
1993) ("Section 102(2)(C), on its face, is clearly not limited to actions of federal agencies
that have significant environmental effects within U.S. borders[,]" and "Congress, when
enacting NEPA, was concerned with worldwide as well as domestic problems facing the
environment.").
5. Massey, 986 F.2d at 530.
6. Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S 281, 285 (1949). For a review of the development
of the extraterritoriality principle see Jonathan Turley, "When in Rome": Multinational
Misconduct and the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 84 Nw. U.L. REV. 598, 603-08
(1990).
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manly concerned with domestic conditions."7 Additionally, the presump-
tion "protect[s] against unintended clashes between our laws and those of
other nations which could result in international discord."' Congress
may, however, provide for the enforcement of its laws outside the United
States.9 To do so, Congress must show, through statutory language, an
"indication of a congressional purpose to extend [the law's] coverage be-
yond places over which the United States has sovereignty or has some
measure of legislative control."'" If, however, such indication of intent is
not clearly and affirmatively shown, a court must presume that the statute
was not meant to apply extraterritorially."
Two recent cases have presented courts with the opportunity to reex-
amine the statute and further define NEPA's extraterritorial application.
In Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 2 the issue before the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit was
whether the National Science Foundation's incineration of food and do-
mestic waste in Antarctica required the preparation of an Environmental
Impact Statement (EIS)." In mandating compliance with NEPA's EIS
provisions, the court held that "the presumption against the extraterrito-
rial application of statutes.., does not apply where the conduct regulated
by the statute occurs primarily, if not exclusively, in the United States,
and the alleged extraterritorial effect of the statute will be felt in Antarc-
tica.' 4 The court limited its decision to Antarctica and the global com-
mons, declining to decide whether NEPA applied to actions involving
sovereign foreign nations. 5 In NEPA Coalition of Japan v. Aspin,'6 the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia was faced with
applying NEPA to conduct occurring in a sovereign foreign nation.
NEPA Coalition involved complaints by a United States citizen and a
7. Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 285. Accord Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v.
Arabian American Oil Co. (ARAMCO), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (Congress legislates
against the backdrop of the presumption against extraterritoriality).
8. ARAMCO, 499 U.S. at 248 (citations omitted).
9. Id. Cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 402 (1987). "[A] state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to (1)(a)
conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place within its territory; ... (c) conduct
outside its territory that has or is intended to have a substantial effect within its territory."
Id.
10. ARAMCO, 499 U.S. at 248 (quoting Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 285).
11. Id.
12. 986 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
13. Id. at 529.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 537.
16. 837 F. Supp. 466 (D.D.C. 1993).
Extraterritorial Application of NEPA
number of Japanese citizens concerning the United States Navy's opera-
tions in Japan.17 In reaching its decision that NEPA did not apply, the
court found Navy operations in Japan were not analogous to those of the
National Science Foundation in Antarctica and even if they were, foreign
policy interests outweighed the benefits of preparing an EIS.18
This Comment critically examines the extraterritorial application of the
National Environmental Policy Act. Part I reviews the statutory imple-
mentation and policy behind NEPA. Part II examines NEPA litigation
and the most recent decisions which suggest a continued vitality of the
extraterritorial doctrine in its application to NEPA. Part III discusses
policy considerations behind the limitation on extraterritorial application
of NEPA, as well as cases promoting its extraterritorial application. This
Comment concludes that Congress should modify the language of NEPA
to specify, with some limitations, its extraterritorial application.
I. STATUTORY LAW AND ITS POLICY BASIS
A. National Environmental Policy Act
In enacting NEPA, Congress recognized that the use of modern tech-
nology had caused many unforeseen and dangerous consequences.1 9 Fur-
thermore, it believed that America's capacity to deal with environmental
problems would be enhanced if "Congress clarifie[d] the goals, concepts,
and procedures which determine and guide the programs and the activi-
ties of Federal agencies."20 It also found that an "independent review of
the interrelated problems associated with environmental quality was of
17. See Pl.'s 1st Am. Compl. at 6-42, NEPA Coalition of Japan v. Cheney (No. 91-
1522), decided sub nom. NEPA Coalition of Japan v. Aspin, 837 F. Supp. 466 (D.D.C.
1993). The three major areas covered in the complaint are: (1) Flight operations from U.S.
and joint facilities with the associated noise and crash hazards; (2) Safety to navigation and
the danger of collisions in the Tokyo Bay; and (3) General environmental degradation
around U.S. military facilities. Id. at 48-59.
18. NEPA Coalition, 837 F. Supp. at 467.
19. Some of the side effects mentioned include radioactive waste, runoff of nitrogen
fertilizers into rivers, smog from automobiles, pesticide residue, and topsoil destruction.
H.R. REP. No. 378, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2751,
2753.
20. S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1969). Significantly, for interpreting the
focus of the Act, when discussing the bill, the Senate Committee referred to "our Nation's
natural resources," and determined that, "a congressional statement is required of the
evolving national objectives of managing our physical surroundings, our land, air, water,
open space and other natural resources and environmental amenities." Id. (emphasis ad-
ded). However, in its Explanation of Amendments, the Committee stated that one of the
goals of § 102's procedures and principles was "to support appropriate activities designed
to deal with international environmental problems." Id. at 7.
1994]
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critical importance."21 Through NEPA, Congress intended to "promote
efforts which [would] prevent or eliminate damage to the environment
and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man."2 2 In order
to accomplish this goal, the Senate put certain "action-enforcing" proce-
dures into NEPA.3 It required that "to the fullest extent possible ... all
agencies of the federal government shall ... include in every recommen-
dation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal ac-
tions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a
detailed statement ... on ... the environmental impact of the proposed
action." 24 The Act, however, is silent on whether this EIS requirement is
applicable outside the United States. NEPA merely recognizes "the
worldwide and long-range character of environmental problems[,] and
where consistent with the foreign policy of the United States, [directs]
lend[ing] appropriate support to initiatives, resolutions, and programs
designed to maximize international cooperation in anticipating and
preventing a decline in the quality of mankind's world environment."25
B. Executive Order 12,114
Recognizing NEPA's gap in coverage, Executive Order 12,114 was
promulgated to "further[ ] the purpose of the National Environmental
Policy Act ... consistent with the foreign policy and national security
policy of the United States.",26 The Order directs agencies approving ac-
tions outside the United States to prepare an analysis of the environmen-
tal impact and consider it in their decision making process. 27 The type of
analysis required varies with the category of the Federal action.28 The
21. H.R. REP. No. 378 at 3, supra note 19, reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2753.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988).
23. S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1969).
.24. 42 U.S.C. § 4332.
25. Id. § 4332(2)(F). Many commentators argue that NEPA is applicable outside the
United States stressing the broad nature and scope of its language. See George H. Keller,
Note, Greenpeace U.S.A. v. Stone: The Comprehensive Environmental Impact Statement
and the Extraterritorial Reach of NEPA, 14 U.' HAW. L. REV. 751 (1992); R. David
Kitchen, Comment, NEPA's Overseas Myopia: Real or Imagined?, 71 GEO. L.J. 1201
(1983); Comment, NEPA's Role in Protecting the World Environment, 131 U. PA. L. REV.
353 (1982).
26. Exec. Order No. 12,114 § 1-1, 3 C.F.R. 356 (1980), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321
(1988).
27. Id. § 2-3.
28. Id. § 2-4. Potential documents include:
(i) environmental impact statements (including generic, program and specific
statements); (ii) bilateral or multilateral environmental studies, relevant or re-
lated to the proposed action, by the United States and one or more foreign na-
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Executive Order also provides for certain exemptions from, and allows
for considerations to, the requirement for environmental analysis. The
exemptions may be classified into three categories: Presidential exclusion,
no general impact, and critical importance.29 Additionally, certain broad
policy considerations allow an agency to modify the contents, timing, and
availability of the document in order to meet national goals.30 Signifi-
cantly, the Order states that it shall not be construed to create a cause of
action.3 '
II. CASE LAW SHOWS COURTS RECOGNIZE A FOREIGN POLICY
EXCEPTION TO NEPA
Since NEPA's passage, federal courts have attempted to determine
whether the Act is applicable to those actions that have little or no impact
on the United States but have, instead, an impact on a foreign country.
32
Over time case law has developed that suggests where the foreign policy
considerations are significant, courts will refrain from enforcing NEPA
tions, or by an international body or organization in which the United States is a
member or participant; or (iii) concise reviews of the environmental issues in-
volved, including environmental assessments, summary environmental analyses
or other appropriate documents.
Id.
29. Id. § 2-5(a). Actions taken by the President, § 2-5(a)(ii). Those falling within the
no general impact category include: actions not having a significant effect on the environ-
ment outside the United States as determined by the agency, § 2-5(a)(i); and votes and
other actions in international conferences and organizations, § 2-5(a)(vi). Those actions
falling within the critical importance category include: actions taken by or pursuant to the
direction of the President or Cabinet officer when the national security or interest is in-
volved or when the action occurs in the course of armed conflict, § 2-5(a)(iii); intelligence
activities and arms transfers, § 2-5(a)(iv); nuclear export licenses, § 2-5(a)(v); and disaster
and emergency relief action, § 2-5(a)(vii).
30. Id. § 2-5(b). Documents may be modified to:
(i) enable the agency to decide and act promptly as and when required; (ii) avoid
adverse impacts on foreign relations or infringement in fact or in appearance of
other nations' sovereign responsibilities, or (iii) ensure appropriate reflection of:
(1) diplomatic factors; (2) international commercial, competitive and export pro-
motion factors; (3) needs for governmental or commercial confidentiality; (4) na-
tional security considerations; (5) difficulties of obtaining information and agency
ability to analyze meaningfully environmental effects of a proposed action; and
(6) the degree to which the agency is involved in or able to affect a decision to be
made.
Id.
31. Id. § 3-1. The section states: "[t]his Order is solely for the purpose of establishing
internal procedures for Federal agencies to consider the significant effects of their actions
on the environment outside the United States, its territories and possessions, and nothing
in this Order shall be construed to create a cause of action." Id.
32. See discussion infra parts II.A-F, H.
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extraterritorially
33
A. Wilderness Society v. Morton
The first case to apply NEPA in an extraterritorial setting was Wilder-
ness Society v. Morton.34 In Wilderness Society, the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit allowed a Canadian citi-
zen and a Canadian environmental organization to intervene in litigation
concerning compliance with NEPA prior to issuance of a permit for the
trans-Alaska pipeline. 5 Domestic groups concerned with the potential
effect of the pipeline filed an action in federal court and the Canadians
sought to intervene on the ground that the American groups would not
protect Canadian interests.36 The Wilderness Society court found that
either of the two proposed routes for the pipeline-across Canada to the
United States or terminating at a supertanker port in Valdez, Alaska, for
seaborne shipment to the lower states-would have a potentially severe
impact on Canada. 7 The court held that "the interests of the United
States and Canadian environmental groups [were] sufficiently antagonis-
tic" to grant the application for intervention.
38
Although the court had allowed foreign nationals to intervene in the
litigation, this did not raise any foreign policy questions. Indeed, while
other appellees had objected to the Canadians' presence in the litigation,
the government had not.39 Judge Tamm, in his concurring opinion, stated
that he saw "no problem with regard to separation of powers or interfer-
ence with the conduct of foreign relations" in the issue before the court."
Thus, although the court had applied NEPA extraterritorially for the first
33. See discussion infra parts II.A-F, H.
34. 463 F.2d 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (per curiam).
35. Id. at 1261.
36. Id. At that time a preliminary injunction had already been granted and the Secre-
tary of Commerce was preparing and circulating an impact statement to support the pro-
ject. Id. at 1261-62.
37. Id. at 1262. While the danger to Canada of the overland route was obvious to the
court, some of the potential impacts from the seaborne shipment option included damage
to British Columbia's fishing and logging industries and harm to Canada's shoreline recrea-
tional property that might be caused by a tanker running aground. Id.
38. Id. The court also noted that permitting the intervention would not in any way
delay the litigation. Id.
39. Id. at 1262 n.2. The Canadian appellants were concurrently appearing before the
Secretary of the Interior in the administrative proceedings related to the pipeline. The
court found no reason why they should not be allowed to participate in judicial proceed-
ings as well. Id.
40. Id. at 1263 (Tamm, J., concurring).
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time, it had already recognized that foreign policy considerations may at
times outweigh the benefits of an EIS.
B. People of Enewetak v. Laird
In People of Enewetak v. Laird,4 ' the United States District Court for
the District of Hawaii held that NEPA was applicable to federal actions
in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.42 Enewetak involved the use
of the atoll for experiments to determine the vulnerability of strategic
defenses to nuclear attack.43 In order to conduct the tests, large areas of
the islands would be cleared of vegetation and topsoil before detonating
high explosives to determine the "cratering" effect of a simulated nuclear
weapon." In its analysis, the Enewetak court first examined the language
of the statute to determine whether NEPA applied in this context.45
Finding the statute "silent on the extent of its coverage," the court in-
spected the legislative history and general aim of the Act to determine
the legislature's intent.' 6 The Enewetak court concluded that "NEPA is
not restricted to United States territory delimited by the fifty states., 47 It
based this conclusion on the lawmakers' use of the broader term "Na-
tion" where one would expect to find the more limiting term "United
States.,48 In fact, the court found NEPA "phrased so expansively that
41. 353 F. Supp. 811 (D. Haw. 1973).
42. Id. at 819.
43. Id. at 814.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 815.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 816.
48. Id. The court cited as an example 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) which states in part:
In order to carry out the policy set forth in this chapter, it is the continuing
responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable means, consistent
with other essential considerations of national policy, to improve and coordinate
Federal plans, functions, programs, and resources to the end that the nation may
and 42 U.S.C. § 4341, which deals with Presidential Environmental Quality Reports, set-
ting forth:
(1) the status and condition of the major natural, manmade, or altered environ-
mental classes of the Nation ... (2) current-and foreseeable trends in the quality,
management and utilization of such environments and the effects of those trends
on the social, economic, and other requirements of the Nation; (3) the adequacy
of available natural resources for fulfilling human and economic requirements of
the Nation in the light of expected population pressures; (4) a review of the pro-
grams and activities (including regulatory activities) of the Federal Government,
the State and local governments, and nongovernmental entities or individuals ....
Id. (emphasis in original).
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there appears to have been a conscious effort to avoid the use of restric-
tive or limiting terminology."49
Comparing the status of the peoples of the Trust Territory to that of the
Canadian citizens in Wilderness Society v. Morton, 0 the court found that
peoples of the Trust Territory had a stronger justification for protection
because they did not have an independent government to protect them.
5 '
Instead, they were forced to rely on the government of the United
States.52 In its consideration of the relationship of Enewetak to the
United States, the court examined the United Nations Trusteeship Agree-
ment and the negotiations leading up to it.5" The final Trusteeship
Agreement gave the administering authority "full powers of administra-
tion, legislation and jurisdiction" over the territory. 4 The original lan-
guage was even more specific, in that it would have included the words,
"as an integral part of the United States.",55 Although this phrase was
eventually deleted, the United States reaffirmed before the United Na-
tions Security Council that United States authority over the Trust Terri-
tory should in no way be considered lessened by this deletion, and the
people of Enewetak would have all the protections enjoyed by United
States citizens.5 6 The Enewetak court did not consider its application of
49. Id. Accordingly, the court cited with approval the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit which concluded that "Itjhe sweep of NEPA is extraor-
dinarily broad, compelling consideration of any and all types of environmental impact of
federal action." Id. at 817 (quoting Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. Atomic
Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1122 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).
50. 463 F.2d 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (per curiam)..
51. People of Enewetak v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 811, 818 (D. Haw. 1973).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 818-19.
54. Id. at 818 n.12. The complete text of the United Nations Trusteeship Agreement
Article 3 reads:
The administering authority [the United States] shall have full powers of adminis-
tration, legislation, and jurisdiction over the territory subject to the provisions of
this agreement, and may apply to the trust territory, subject to any modifications
which the administering authority may consider desirable, such of the laws of the
United States as it may deem appropriate to local conditions and requirements.
Id. (quoting 1 Whiteman, DIG. INT'L. L. 777-78 (June 1963)).
55. Id. at 818. The words were stricken from the agreement upon objection of the
Soviet Union. Id. at 818-19.
56. Id. at 819 (quoting U.N. SCOR, 2d Sess., 116th mtg. at 473 (1947). The U.S. Rep-
resentative went on to say:
My Government feels that it has a duty towards the peoples of the trust territory
to govern them with no less consideration than it would govern any part of its
sovereign territory. It feels that the laws, customs and institutions of the United
States form a basis for the administration of the trust territory compatible with
the spirit of the Charter. For administrative, legislative and jurisdictional conven-
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NEPA to be outside the jurisdiction of the United States.57 Instead, the
court based its decision on the finding that the people of Enewetak were
subject to the authority of the United States even though they were not
citizens and lived outside the fifty states.5 8
C. Sierra Club v. Adams
The next opportunity for a court to examine NEPA's extraterritorial
reach came about in Sierra Club v. Adams. 9 There, a decision enjoining
United States participation in construction of the Darien Gap Highway in
Panama and Colombia due to an allegedly deficient EIS was challenged
by federal officials.' The United States District Court for the District of
Columbia determined that the Department of Transportation's EIS was
insufficient.6 ' Specifically, the court found that the EIS had "inade-
quately examined the environmental impact of the highway about three
matters: 1) the control of aftosa, or foot-and-mouth disease; 2) possible
alternative routes for the highway; and 3) the effect on the Cuna and
Choco Indians inhabiting the area that the highway was expected to
traverse. 62
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, the general application of NEPA to the project was not
in contention. The government conceded that the Sierra Club had stand-
ing to challenge the EIS with regard to the possible spread of aftosa, and
ience in carrying out its duty towards the peoples of the trust territory, the United
States intends to treat the trust territory as if it were an integral part of the United
States.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
57. The court found it "unnecessary to decide [the] question" of whether the statute
applied extraterritorially due to its inclusion of Enewetak Atoll within the "Nation" pro-
tected by NEPA. Id. at 817 n.10.
58. Id. at 818.
59. 578 F.2d 389 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
60. Id. at 390. The 250 mile paved road would complete the last phase of the Pan
American Highway which runs from Prudhoe Bay, Alaska, to Santiago, Chile. Id.
61. Id. at 391 (citing Sierra Club v. Coleman, 421 F. Supp. 63 (D.D.C. 1976) (Coleman
1), vacated, 578 F.2d 389 (1978)). The Sierra Club had originally brought a suit against the
government alleging that the government failed to prepare any EIS. The district court
granted the motion and enjoined the government from further participation on the project
until completing an EIS. See Sierra Club v. Coleman, 405 F. Supp. 53 (D.D.C. 1975), va-
cated, 578 F.2d 389 (1978) (Coleman b. Sierra Club commenced the later proceeding after
the government had prepared an EIS and filed notice of its intent to resume construction.
Coleman II, 421 F. Supp. 63.
62. Adams, 578 F.2d at 391 (citing Coleman II, 421 F. Supp. at 65-67).
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the court agreed.63 However, the government contended the Sierra Club
lacked standing to challenge the EIS on potential alternatives to the pro-
ject and effects on the Indian population. 64 The Adams court rapidly dis-
posed of the question of jurisdiction over the potential alternatives to the
project.65 As the court saw the issue, it was merely an extension of the
aftosa control problem in which the no-action alternative would protect
the United States from spread of the disease.66 The issue of the effect of
the proposed highway on the Indians presented a more difficult question
for the court.67 In its determination of standing, the court relied on the
Supreme Court's statement in Sierra Club v. Morton6' that "the fact of
... injury is what gives a person standing to seek judicial review under the
statute [in question], but once review is properly invoked, that person
may argue the public interest in support of his claim that the agency has
failed to comply with its statutory mandate., 69 The Adams court found
the public interest concept "particularly applicable to cases brought
under NEPA."7° This was especially true as "[a]n interpretation that un-
necessarily restricts the ability of plaintiffs properly before the court to
challenge additional inadequacies in an environmental impact statement
would be patently inconsistent with the unequivocal legislative intent em-
bodied in NEPA that agencies comply with its requirements 'to the fullest
extent possible."' 7 Because the Sierra Club established an independent
basis to challenge the impact statement, the Adams court ultimately
granted them standing on their claim that the EIS did not adequately
address the effect of construction on the Cuna and Choco Indians.72 In
reaching its decision, the court had merely "assumed" that NEPA was





67. Id. The court noted that the appellees had not alleged any specific harm that they
would suffer in the event the issue was inadequately discussed. Id. at 391-92.
68. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
69. Sierra Club v. Adams, 578 F.2d 389, 392 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (citing Morton, 405 U.S.
at 737) (alterations in original).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 393 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4332).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 392 n.14 (emphasis added). Later, the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia also assumed that an EIS was required under NEPA for the spraying
of a herbicide over marijuana plants in Mexico due to the spraying's potential impact in the
United States. See National Org. for Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) v. United
States, 452 F. Supp. 1226 (D.D.C. 1978).
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ity of NEPA outside the United States had not been settled, the court left
"resolution of [that] important issue to another day."74
D. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
In Natural Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion, (NRDC),75 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit was presented with the opportunity to resolve the ques-
tion it left unanswered in Sierra Club v. Adams,76 whether an environ-
mental impact statement must be prepared where any potential impact
would be solely within a foreign nation.77 NRDC involved the license
and export of a nuclear reactor and fuel to the Republic of the Philip-
pines.78 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) had concluded that
the export of the reactor met all the conditions of the Atomic Energy
Act,79 as amended by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act.8" Specifically,
the NRC found the exportation of the reactor "would not create unac-
ceptable health, safety or environmental risks to U.S. territory or the
global commons." 81 In a second order, the Commission declared it would
"only consider those health, safety, and environmental impacts arising
from exports of nuclear reactors that affect the territory of the United
States or the global commons."'82 The Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil (NRDC) appealed the Commission's orders, contending that in addi-
tion to not meeting the obligations of the Atomic Energy Act,83 the NRC
failed in meeting its NEPA requirement to conduct a site-specific envi-
74. Sierra Club v. Adams, 578 F.2d 389, 392 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Although the ap-
pellees took the position that NEPA applied whether the impact occurred in the United
States or in another country, the government had intimated that NEPA might not apply to
"purely local concerns" outside the United States. Id.
75. 647 F.2d 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
76. 578 F.2d 389 (D.C. Cir. 1978); see supra notes 73, 74 and accompanying text.
77. NRDC v. NRC, 647 F.2d 1345, 1347-48.
78. Id. at 1348.
79. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2297 (1988).
80. 22 U.S.C. §§ 3201-3282 (1988).
81. NRDC v. NRC, 647 F.2d at 1348 (quoting Westinghouse Electric Corp., 11 N.R.C.
631 (1980)).
82. Id. at 1348 (quoting Westinghouse Electric Corp., 11 N.R.C. 672 (1980)).
83. Id. at 1355. The NRDC contended that not taking into account the 32,000 U.S.
military personnel stationed near the reactor site and potential effects on the Republic of
the Philippines or on U.S. prestige in the event of an accident resulted in "a meaningless
NRC finding that... export... would not be inimical to the 'common defense and secur-
ity' of the United States or to the 'health and safety of the public."' Id.
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ronmental impact statement.84
In its examination of foreign impacts, the NRDC court first noted that
export licensing decisions occur within the United States, but "export of
any commodity across national boundaries calls into play, and sometimes
into conflict, the national interests of the exporter-country and the im-
porter-country., 8 5 In the court's view, conditioning export licenses on
U:S. standards would impact on a foreign sovereign's domestic law as
much as a law whose explicit purpose was to compel foreign behavior.
Therefore, the court concluded, the extraterritorial principle governs,
thus limiting the reach of the U.S. statute. 6 This limitation would not,
however, withstand "an unequivocal mandate from Congress" because
"[w]here a statute directs an agency of the United States to consider for-
eign environmental impacts no court of the United States will contravene
the will of Congress."' 7 Unable to find a clear congressional mandate, 8
the court attempted to reconcile U.S. regulatory interests with the extra-
territoriality principle. 9
In commencing its analysis under NEPA, the NRDC court stated its
reluctance to apply the statute extraterritorially and noted that "NEPA
jurisprudence indicates that exclusively foreign impacts do not automati-
cally invoke the statute's environmental obligations."9 In fact, the court
found NEPA's language "look[ed] toward cooperation, not unilateral ac-
tion, [such as automatic application of the statute,] in a manner consistent
with [U.S.] foreign policy."91 Although the statute was written in broad
general terms, the court held that it "reflect[ed] the perception of a global
problem from the American perspective, and offer[ed] a procedural rem-
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1356.
86. Id. at 1356-57.
87. Id. at 1357. "The only exception would be if the legislature were wholly without
jurisdiction to prescribe the relevant conduct. . . ." Id.
88. Id. The court also concluded that "NEPA's legislative history illuminates nothing
with regard to extraterritorial application." Id. at 1367.
89. Id. at 1357. The guiding principle for the court was that "[wie do honor to the
sovereignty of national governments, our own included, when we respect foreign public
policy by not automatically displacing theirs with ours." Id.
90. Id. at 1366.
91. Id. The court based this on § 102(2)(F) of NEPA which states that all federal gov-
ernment agencies shall: "recognize the worldwide and long-range character of environ-
mental problems and, where consistent with the foreign policy of the United States, lend
appropriate support to initiatives, resolutions, and programs designed to maximize interna-
tional cooperation in anticipating and preventing a decline in the quality of mankind's
world environment." Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(F) (1989)) (emphasis in original).
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edy to assist in a solution for Americans." 92 Because "Congress can out-
line national goals for Americans only[,]" and other cultures in other
countries will react in their own ways to global problems, any extraterri-
torial application of U.S. law should be narrowly construed.93 Failing to
find any conclusive congressional intent suggesting extraterritorial appli-
cation, the court turned its attention to judicial precedents. 94
In its review of the case law, the NRDC court found the previous deci-
sions that did address the application of NEPA beyond U.S. borders were
"both factually distinguishable and missing the foreign policy element" of
the matter before the court.95 The court distinguished Wilderness Society
v. Morton96 on three grounds. First, whereas Wilderness Society was an
intervention case dealing only with procedural matters, NRDC dealt di-
rectly with the applicability of NEPA beyond U.S. territory.97 Second,
while Wilderness Society posed "no problem with regard to separation of
powers or interference in the conduct of foreign relations," the matter
before the court had the potential to adversely affect the United States
Philippine relationship.98 Finally, unlike Wilderness Society, the NRC
92. Id. at 1366-67.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1367.
95. Id. (emphasis in original). The court also cited with approval the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia's statement that "[t]he extraterritoriality of
NEPA remains an open question in this Circuit." Id. (quoting National Org. for Reform of
Marijuana Laws (NORML) v. United States, 452 F. Supp. 1226, 1232 (D.D.C. 1978).
96. 463 F.2d 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (per curiam). See discussion supra part II.A.
97. NRDC v. NRC, 647 F.2d 1345, 1367 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Unlike Wilderness Society,
the NRDC petitioners were not citizens of a foreign state claiming potential injury. In fact,
the court noted that "the direction of foreign antagonism runs against the petitioners them-
selves, who from non-adjacent America presume that they can represent the Philippine
environment." Id. Additionally, the court noted that "Wilderness does not address at all
the substantive issue whether NEPA extends to a foreign environment," and "[i]t is en-
tirely silent on ... whether an EIS must be prepared for a project with no environmental
impact within the United States." Id.
98. Id. (quoting Wilderness Society, 463 F.2d at 1263 (Tamm, J., concurring)). The
Department of State had conducted its own studies of the Philippine reactor application to
consider the site in view of its proximity to U.S. military facilities and the seismically active
location. After discussions with the Philippine Atomic Energy Commission and taking
into account foreign policy considerations, the State Department approved the export li-
cense. Id. 647 F.2d at 1351-52. Additionally, the government of the Philippines raised
other foreign policy considerations in its statement that:
[i]f the United States followed a policy of imposing its own regulatory procedures
and standards on all host countries involved in advanced technology trade with
the United States, such a policy would undoubtedly bode ill for the ability of the
United States to maintain military facilities in as many locations around the world
as it now does.
Id. at 1356 (quoting Brief Amicus Curiae of the Republic of the Philippines at 23).
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would exercise no ongoing control over the project once the licensing
decision was made. 99
The NRDC court noted that its finding NEPA inapplicable to a sover-
eign nation was "completely consistent with People of Enewetak [v.
Laird],'' ° which applied the statute to United States Trust Territories on
the theory they were part of the "Nation" and not sovereign.' In its
review of Sierra Club v. Adams,10 2 the court noted that the EIS require-
ment had originally been mandated due to concern about the spread of
aftosa to the United States.0 a In NRDC, however, there was determined
to be no potential impact on the United States.' °" Furthermore, NRDC,
unlike Adams and Wilderness Society, showed no ongoing governmental
financial responsibility or control over the project.0 5 Finally, the court
determined that Adams held no precedential value as the court "did not
decide the NEPA extraterritoriality issue.""
Although limiting its holding to nuclear export licensing decisions, the
NRDC court recognized that the United States may, in many situations,
be able to enforce its laws across national borders when it "holds all the
cards," such as in a foreign development setting.0 7 Nevertheless, the
court cautioned that "we should not assign an insignificant place to the
foreign political interest."10 8 The court went on to suggest "[s]ome bal-
ancing, or recognition of latent conflict of laws, would seem judicious to
reconcile the separate but not inconsistent national interests."' 0 9 One
such significant interest is foreign relations, where "[r]esponsibility ...
rests finally in the executive branch to ensure achievement of the nation's
foreign policy goal[s]."" Determining to what extent environmental re-
view "risks unduly impeding the conduct of United States foreign rela-
tions" is left to the courts."'
99. The United States Government would maintain responsibility for the pipeline
once it was completed and in operation. Id. at 1367-68.
100. 353 F. Supp. 811 (D. Haw. 1973).
101. NRDC v. NRC, 647 F.2d at 1368. See discussion supra part II.B.
102. 578 F.2d 389 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
103. NRDC v. NRC, 647 F.2d at 1368.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. See discussion supra part II.C.
107. NRDC v. NRC, 647 F.2d at 1357.
108. Id.
109. Id. (emphasis in original).
110. Id. at 1358.
111. Id. One such impediment was that if the EIS requirement was enforced, "there
Extraterritorial Application of NEPA
E. Greenpeace U.S.A. v. Stone
The foreign affairs exception to NEPA was further refined in Green-
peace U.S.A. v. Stone," 2 which concerned the United States Army's
transportation and destruction of obsolete unitary chemical weapons
which had been stockpiled in the Federal Republic of Germany
(FRG)." 3 Three of Greenpeace's claims were based on NEPA and one
involved its extraterritorial application." 4 Specifically, Greenpeace con-
tended that the Army improperly segmented the operation instead of
considering all parts in a comprehensive EIS." 5 In determining whether
NEPA applied to the movement of munitions in Germany and their
transoceanic shipment, the United States District Court for the District of
Hawaii considered the foreign policy implications that would result from
the statute's application." 6 Crucial to the court's determination was that
the movement of munitions resulted from an agreement between the
President and a foreign head of state.' 17 The court considered this to be a
would be the spectre of litigation over the adequacy of the EIS, with delay the inevitable
result." Id. at 1366.
112. 748 F. Supp. 749 (D. Haw. 1990), appeal dismissed as moot, 924 F.2d 175 (9th Cir.
1991).
113. Id. at 752. The United States Army undertook the plan in coordination with the
West German Army to remove the munitions from Germany and transport them to a facil-
ity on Johnston Atoll where they would be destroyed in the Johnston Atoll Chemical
Agent Disposal System (JACADS). Id. The transportation involved three phases; trans-
portation of the weapons from their magazines to a railhead in Germany; shipment by rail
to a German port facility; and transport by sea to Johnston Atoll. Id. at 753.
114. Id. at 757. The NEPA complaints not involving extraterritorial application of the
statute were that the Army failed to evaluate the full range of alternatives to its action; and
that it failed to consider important new information in its second supplemental EIS. Id.
The non-NEPA complaints were that the Army failed to meet its reporting requirements to
Congress as required by the Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 1990, id. at
765; and that movement of the weapons violated both the Basel Convention on the Con-
trol of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal and the
London Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and
other Matter. Id. at 767.
115. Id. at 757.
116. Id. The court considered the serious disruption to foreign policy which might re-
sult from halting shipments that had been planned and conducted in a joint operation with
the German Army. Id. at 754. Additionally, German courts had already examined the
issue and determined that the plan "complied with German law and the danger posed by
the plan was tolerable and did not violate any German constitutional rights." Id. at 754.
Imposition of NEPA after the German court had found no impact would encroach on the
jurisdiction of Germany to implement its own political decisions. Id. at 760.
117. Id. at 757-58. President Reagan, in an agreement with Chancellor Kohl, promised
to remove the chemical munitions prior to December, 1992. Subsequently, President Bush
agreed with Chancellor Kohl to speed up the process so that all of the weapons would be
out of Germany by December, 1990. Id.
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legitimate exercise of the President's foreign affairs powers." 8 As NEPA
"clearly recognizes ... actions should be taken 'consistent with the for-
eign policy of the United States,"' the Presidential agreement was ac-
corded some force in weighing whether NEPA applied." 9
Keeping the importance of the foreign policy considerations in mind,
the court turned its attention to the German phase of the operation.
120
Upon finding that "NEPA's legislative history illuminates nothing in re-
gard to extraterritorial application," the court attempted to determine
whether Congress intended NEPA to apply under the facts of the case at
bar.121 The Greenpeace court noted that the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit in deciding NRDC v. NRC, had
considered that "extraterritorial application of United States regulatory
laws might result in a conflict with or a displacement of the foreign sover-
eign's own regulations., 2 2 The Greenpeace court found itself facing a
similar situation, in that extraterritorial application of NEPA would show
"a lack of respect for the FRG's sovereignty, authority and control over
actions taken within its borders.' 23 This was especially true as any envi-
ronmental impact during the overland transport stage would be felt solely
in Germany. 24 Another factor which played a role in the Greenpeace
court's decision was that Congress had mandated the destruction of the
chemical weapons stockpile and the President's actions were in further-
ance of that mandate. 125 In setting the schedule for the weapons re-
moval, the President was acting within his foreign policy powers, and
although NEPA was a procedural statute, its application would interfere
with the substance of the President's commitment. 26 The Greenpeace
118. Id. at 758.
119. Id. at 758-59 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(F) (1989)).
120. Id. at 758.
121. Id. at 759 (quoting NRDC v. NRC, 647 F.2d 1345, 1367 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). The
court found NRDC was the "only appellate decision which directly addresses the question
of whether NEPA applies extraterritorially to require evaluation of environmental impacts
solely within a foreign jurisdiction." Id. at 759 n.10.
122. Id. at 760 (citing NRDC v. NRC, 647 F.2d at 1356-57).
123. Id.
124. Id. The court was aware that the movement of the weapons was being carried out
largely by United States Army personnel, but it felt that German sovereignty and United
States foreign policy concerns outweighed the impact on American forces. Id. See also
NRDC v. NRC, 647 F.2d at 1367 (32,000 U.S. Military forces were stationed in the Philip-
pines near the site of the proposed reactor. The State Department initially withheld per-
mission for an export license but after receiving diplomatic assurances, and taking into
account foreign policy considerations, it withdrew its objection.).
125. Stone, 748 F. Supp. at 761.
126. Id. The court went so far as to note, "[pilaintiffs' assertion that application of
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court concluded that NEPA did not apply to the movement of munitions
within Germany because it would result in "grave foreign policy implica-
tions and would substantively interfere with a decision of the President
and a foreign sovereign in a manner not intended or anticipated by
Congress." '127
The court next considered NEPA's application to the transoceanic ship-
ment phase of the operation. The court began its analysis by noting that,
unlike the German transport phase, the seaborne phase was not "within
the sovereign borders of a foreign nation or in concert with that foreign
nation."' 28 Because the shipment was over the global commons, "foreign
policy considerations ... are not implicated to the same extent.' 129 An-
other difference was that under Executive Order 12,114, the Army was
required to prepare a written assessment of the impact of its operations
on the global commons. 3 ° Prior to commencement of the weapons ship-
ment, that assessment was completed for all the potential sea routes be-
tween Germany and Johnston Atoll. 13  The study concluded that
"normal operations ... would cause no significant impact on the environ-
ment of the global commons, assuming that none of the low probability
accidents examined actually occur."'1 3 2 The Greenpeace court was per-
suaded that although Executive Order 12,114 did not preempt NEPA's
application overseas, compliance with the order would be given weight in
determining whether the global commons transoceanic shipment phase of
the operation must be incorporated into the EIS for Johnston Atoll
NEPA to the defendants' action within West Germany would not substantively interfere
with executive action ignores reality." Id.
127. Id. The court emphasized that its decision was limited to the specific facts of the
case. Id.
128. Id. at 761.
129. Id. "'Global commons' signifies the high seas, Antarctica, and portions of the at-
mosphere outside the sovereign jurisdiction of a single nation." NRDC v. NRC, 647 F.2d
at 1348 n.8 (citation omitted).
130. Exec. Order No. 12,114, supra note 26, §§ 2-3(a), 2-4(b)(i).
131. Greenpeace U.S.A. v. Stone, 748 F. Supp. 749, 761 (D. Haw. 1990), appeal dis-
missed as moot, 924 F.2d 175 (9th Cir. 1991). The global commons environmental assess-
ment discussed "the effects of the transportation on water quality; air quality; the risks to
threatened, endangered and special interest species; risks to commercial fisheries and to
the human population." Id. at 761-62 (citations and footnote omitted).
132. Id. at 762 (quoting Finding of No Significant Impact, Apr. 30, 1990). Only com-
plete loss of the ship, uncontrollable fire, or large terrorist attack would cause release of
contaminants according to the Global Commons Environmental Assessment. These
events were not determined to be likely to occur as the transport ship would be escorted
along the route. In fact, the study determined that there was only 1 in 500,000 chance of
human casualties occurring. Id. at 762 n.14.
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Chemical Agent Disposal System (JACADS). 13 3 Additionally, the court
noted that the movement through the global commons was "a necessary
consequence" of the removal of the munitions from Germany and their
destruction on Johnston Atoll.' The Greenpeace court found the Ger-
man phase of the operation more compelling, and applied the foreign
policy concerns it had annunciated earlier.'35 With these foreign policy
considerations and the Army's preparation of a Global Commons Envi-
ronmental Assessment (GCEA) taken into account, the court found itself
compelled to conclude that NEPA had not been violated by the failure
"to consider the transoceanic shipment of chemical munitions to Johnston
Atoll in the same comprehensive EIS as the incineration of those
munitions."
1 36
F. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Massey
In Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 3 7 the extent of
NEPA's application to sovereignless extraterritorial areas was examined.
The Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) had brought a suit in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia seeking to pre-
vent the National Science Foundation (NSF) from incinerating its food
wastes in Antarctica.' 38 NSF had previously burned its McMurdo Sta-
tion 139 food wastes in an open pit, but in an attempt to improve its envi-
ronmental practices, it decided to begin incinerating the waste.' 4 ° While
waiting for a new "state-of-the-art" incinerator, NSF planned to dispose
of the waste through the use of an "interim incinerator."'' The EDF
opposed this plan, contending that the incineration might "produce
highly toxic pollutants which could be hazardous to the environment,' 42




137. 986 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
138. Environmental Defense Fund v. Massey, 772 F. Supp. 1296, 1297 (D.D.C. 1991),
rev'd, 986 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
139. The court noted that:
McMurdo Station is one of three year-round installations that the United States
has established in Antarctica, and over which NSF exercises exclusive control.
All of the installations serve as platforms or logistic centers for U.S. scientific
research; McMurdo is the largest of the three, with more than 100 buildings and a
summer population of approximately 1200.
Massey, 986 F.2d at 529.
140. Id. at 529-30.
141. ld.
142. Id. at 530.
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and that "NSF [had] not prepared the proper environmental analysis as
required under [NEPA], 43 . . . regulations of the Council on Environ-
mental Quality'" . . .and Executive Order 12,114145. ' '146 Specifically,
EDF sought declaratory and injunctive relief under NEPA section
102(2)(C), 147 stating that NSF had violated the Act's EIS requirement.
48
In its analysis, the district court relied on Equal Opportunity Employment
Commission v. Arabian American Oil Co. (ARAMCO)149 to support the
contention that a statute may apply extraterritorially only when "the af-
firmative intention of the Congress [is] clearly expressed."' 5 ° Finding no
such intent,' 5 ' the district court dismissed the case citing a lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.
152
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, the issue was framed as "whether the application of
NEPA to agency actions in Antarctica presents an extraterritoriality
problem at all.' 153 The court separated this determination into two parts.
The first test was "whether the statute [sought] to regulate conduct in the
United States or in another sovereign country.' 154 If action in a foreign
country was implicated, then the second test was "whether NEPA would
create a potential for 'clashes between our laws and those of other na-
tions"' when applied to federal agency decision making regarding pro-
posed actions.' 55
In the first part of its analysis, the D.C. Circuit examined the presump-
tion against the extraterritorial application of statutes. This presumption
has been defined as "[r]ules of United States statutory law, whether pre-
scribed by federal or state authority, apply only to conduct occurring
143. NEPA, supra note 1.
144. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-1508 (1990).
145. Exec. Order No. 12,114, supra note 26.
146. Environmental Defense Fund v. Massey, 772 F. Supp. 1296, 1297 (D.D.C. 1991),
rev'd, 986 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
147. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1988).
148. Massey, 986 F.2d at 529.
149. 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
150. Massey, 772 F. Supp. at 1297 (quoting ARAMCO, 499 U.S. at 248).
151. After noting NEPA's language, the court stated that "[w]hile Congress may have
selected broad language to describe NEPA's purpose, Congress failed to provide a clear
expression of legislative intent through a plain statement of extraterritorial statutory ef-
fect." Id.
152. Id. at 1298. The court concluded that "NEPA does not apply extraterritorially and
Executive Order 12,114 does not provide for a private cause of action." Id.
153. Environmental Defense Fund v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 532 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
154. Id.
155. Id. (citation omitted).
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within, or having effect within, the territory of the United States," unless
the contrary is clearly indicated by the statute.156 The Massey court pref-
aced its analysis with the recognition that in Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission v. Arabian American Oil Co.(ARAMCO), 57 the
Supreme Court had reaffirmed the vitality of the extraterritorial princi-
ple.1 58 However, the Massey court noted three exceptions to the general
presumption against extraterritorial application. 5 9 First, the presump-
tion would be precluded when "there is 'an affirmative intention of the
Congress clearly expressed' to extend the scope of the statute to conduct
occurring within other sovereign nations."' 60  Second, an exception
would be made "where the failure to extend the scope of the statute to a
foreign setting [would] result in adverse effects within the United
States.' 61 By way of illustration, the court cited the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act,'62 and the Lanham Act, 63 which had both been found to apply ex-
traterritorially because "failure to extend the statute[s'] reach would have
negative economic consequences within the United States."'" Finally,
the presumption would be invalid where the "conduct regulated by the
government occurs within the United States.' 165 This is so "[e]ven where
the significant effects of the regulated conduct are felt outside U.S.
borders."'"
With the extraterritorial principle and its exceptions in mind, the court
turned to examination of the conduct to be regulated under NEPA. The
Massey court found "NEPA is designed to control the decisionmaking
156. Id. at 530 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 38 (1965); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 403, cmt. g (1987)).
157. 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
158. Environmental Defense Fund v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 530 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
159. Id. at 531.
160. Id. (quoting ARAMCO, 499 U.S. at 248).
161. Id. at 531.
162. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
163. Id. §§ 1051-1128 (1988).
164. Environmental Defense Fund v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 531 (D.C. Cir. 1993). The
use of these two statutes may not have been the best example of extraterritorial reach due
to potential adverse effects in the United States. See Turley, supra note 6, at 634-38 (1990)
(difference in extraterritorial treatment of market-based statutes such as Anti-Trust and
Trademark Acts and non-market based statutes such as NEPA are discussed). Perhaps a
better example would be Sierra Club v. Adams, 578 F.2d 389 (D.C. Cir. 1978). In Sierra
Club, due to the danger that hoof and mouth disease would spread to the United States an
EIS was required before funds could be allocated to the completion of the last section of
the Pan American Highway, even though all construction was to be in Panama. Id. at 391.
165. Massey, 986 F.2d at 531.
166. Id.
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process of U.S. federal agencies, not the substance of agency deci-
sions."16 7 The court also noted that NEPA's EIS requirement only binds
American officials in the process of their decisionmaking.' 68 Critical in
the court's determination though, was its contention that "[b]ecause the
decisionmaking processes of the federal agencies take place almost exclu-
sively in this country and involve the workings of the United States gov-
ernment, they are uniquely domestic."' 69 It further explained that NEPA
"creates no substantive environmental standards and simply prescribes by
statute the factors an agency must consider when exercising its discretion-
ary authority."' 7 ° Finding that NEPA was "designed to regulate conduct
occurring within the territory of the United States, and [that it] imposes
no substantive requirements which could be interpreted to govern con-
duct abroad," the court concluded that the presumption against extrater-
ritoriality did not apply.
17
Having ruled the presumption against extraterritoriality did not apply,
the court went on to examine the status of Antarctica and the foreign
policy implications which would result from application of NEPA. The
court reasoned that Antarctica's unique status as a "sovereignless conti-
nent" supported its conclusion not to apply the presumption. 72 The
Massey court distinguished Aramco by recalling the Supreme Court's
statement that "courts should look to see if there is any indication that
Congress intended to extend the statute's coverage 'beyond places over
which the United States has sovereignty or some measure of legislative
167. Id. at 532. The court concluded that "[b]y enacting NEPA, Congress exercised its
... discretion, and created a process whereby American officials, while acting within the
United States, can reach enlightened policy decisions by taking into account environmental
effects." Such discretion was a legitimate exercise of Congress' authority without any ex-
traterritoriality concerns. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 532 (citing Mary A. McDougall, Extraterritoriality and the Endangered Spe-
cies Act of 1973, 80 GEO. L.J. 435, 445 (1991)). The court observed that "NEPA, unlike
many environmental statutes, does not dictate agency policy or determine the fate of con-
templated action." Id. (citations omitted).
170. Id. at 533. The court commented that NEPA was akin to other "laws directing
federal decisionmakers to consider particular factors before extending aid or engaging in
certain types of trade." Id. (citing Comment, NEPA's Role in Protecting the World Envi-
ronment, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 353, 371 (1982)). The court cited as examples the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act. Id. These examples are
unconvincing for, unlike NEPA, one need look no further than their face to determine the
extraterritorial scope of the laws.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 534. Antarctica was said to be "not a foreign country," but analogized to
outer space. Id. at 533 (quoting Beattie v. United States, 756 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
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control.""73 The court determined that the United States does exert
some measure of legislative control in this situation because it controls all
air transportation to Antarctica and exercises legislative control over
McMurdo Station and other American research installations. In view of
the legislative control it had found, as well as Antarctica's unique status,
the court was compelled to conclude that "the presumption against extra-
territoriality [was] particularly inappropriate.'
'174
The court held that Antarctica, a sovereignless area of the global com-
mons, did not "present the challenges inherent in the relations between
sovereign nations. '' 175 The National Science Foundation argued, how-
ever, that application of NEPA would make "the [United States] a doubt-
ful partner for future international cooperation in Antarctica" because of
the risk of NEPA injunctions.176 The court found this argument unper-
suasive as it was not convinced NSF's ability to cooperate with other na-
tions would be hampered by NEPA injunctions.177 The court reasoned
that where NEPA's section 102(2)(C) EIS requirement conflicted with its
section 102(2)(F) mandate of cooperation with other nations, the EIS re-
quirement would have to yield. 78 While the Massey court applied
NEPA's EIS requirement to NSF's actions in Antarctica, it noted that
foreign policy considerations may potentially outweigh the benefits of an
impact statement and prevent the statute's application. 179 The court left
for another day the determination of how those policy considerations
might be balanced in a case involving a 'sovereign nation.'80
G. Smith v. United States and Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc.
Two United States Supreme Court cases decided after Massey have
shed further light on NEPA's extraterritorial reach. Although not NEPA
173. Id. (quoting Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Arabian American Oil
Co. (ARAMCO), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)).
174. Id. at 534. The court compared the amount of control the United States exercised
in Antarctica with that shown in two previous NEPA cases, People of Enewatak v. Laird,
353 F. Supp. 811 (D. Haw. 1973) and Sierra Club v. Adams, 578 F.2d 389 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
Massey, 986 F.2d at 533; see discussion of Enewatak and Adams supra part II.B-C.
175. Massey, 986 F.2d at 534. However, Antarctica is not without its international con-
troversies. See Smith v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1178, 1180 n.1 (1993) (describing Antarc-
tica as "an entire continent of disputed territory").
176. Massey, 986 F.2d at 534.
177. Id. at 535.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 537.
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cases, Smith v. United States 8' and Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc.'82
appear to limit Massey's application. Smith involved a question of
whether the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)'83 applied to tortious acts
or omissions occurring in Antarctica. 84 Haitian Centers examined
whether a procedural section of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA) 85 was applicable outside the United States.'86 In both cases, the
Supreme Court reached conclusions diametrically opposed to the reason-
ing of the Massey court.
In Smith v. United States, Sandra Jean Smith, the petitioner, filed a
wrongful death action under the FTCA.'87 The United States District
Court for the District of Oregon dismissed the claim, finding it barred by
the foreign country exception to the FTCA. as In deciding the case, the
Supreme Court examined both the meaning of the FTCA phrase "any
claim arising in a foreign country,"' 89 and the general application of stat-
utes outside of the United States. 90 Much like the Massey court's rea-
soning, Smith argued that U.S. law should apply because Antarctica was
not a country, demonstrated by the fact that the United States had not
recognized the legitimacy of another nation's claim over it.191 The Court,
however, determined that a more "commonsense meaning of the term"
"country" should apply.' 92 To find that meaning, the Court looked first
to the dictionary and found "country" defined as "a region or tract of
land." 93 The Court recognized that other interpretations of the term
were possible, but held "the ordinary meaning of the language itself...
includes Antarctica, even though it has no recognized government.' 194
181. 113 S. Ct. 1178 (1993).
182. 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993).
183. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 1402(b), 2401(b), 2671-2680 (1988 & Supp. 111990).
184. Smith, 113 S. Ct. at 1180.
185. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (Supp. IV 1988).
186. Haitian Centers, 113 S. Ct. at 2552.
187. Smith v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1178, 1180-81 (1993). Petitioner's husband
worked for the National Science Foundation at McMurdo Station in Antarctica. He was
killed when he fell into a crevasse after he left the marked trail on a recreational hike. The
wrongful death action alleged "that the United States was negligent in failing to provide
adequate warning of the dangers posed by crevasses in areas beyond marked paths." Id. at
1180.
188. Id.
189. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k).
190. Smith, 113 S. Ct. at 1181, 1183.
191. Id. at 1181.
192. Id.
193. Id. (quoting WEBSRs NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 609 (2d ed. 1945)).
194. Id.
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After a discussion of the FTCA, the Court turned to the presumption
against extraterritorial application of statutes. The Court reiterated "that
legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to ap-
ply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States."'1 95 Be-
cause the petitioner could not show there was clear evidence of
congressional intent to apply the FTCA to Antarctica, she, like the Mas-
sey court, argued that the presumption applies only if it serves to avoid
"unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations which
could result in international discord."' 96 The Court did not find the argu-
ment convincing, however, and concluded "the presumption is rooted in a
number of considerations, not the least of which is the commonsense no-
tion that Congress generally legislates with domestic concerns in
mind."' 97
The second Supreme Court case appearing to limit Massey's applica-
tion, Haitian Centers, involved an attempt by organizations representing
interdicted Haitians to obtain a restraining order against the United
States Coast Guard to prevent the return of intercepted Haitians without
a determination of their refugee status.198 Haitian Centers Inc., the re-
spondent, contended that the plain language of INA § 243(h)(1) was dis-
positive in preventing the return of the refugees. 9 9 The Supreme Court
found that Part V of the INA contained no reference to extraterritorial
application and it could not "reasonably construe § 243(h) to limit the
Attorney General's actions in geographic areas where she [had] not been
authorized to conduct [deportation hearings]. 2 °°
In its examination of extraterritorial statutory application, the Supreme
Court dealt with a Court of Appeals holding which parallelled the reason-
195. Id. at 1183 (quoting Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Arabian Ameri-
can Oil Co. (ARAMCO), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)).
196. Id. at 1183 n.5 (citations omitted).
197. Id. The Court also did not find convincing the argument that the presumption was
defeated "because the FTCA specifically addresses the issue of extraterritorial application
in the foreign country exception." Instead, the "presumption, far from being overcome,....
[was] doubly fortified by the language of th[e] statute and the legislative purpose underly-
ing it." Id. at 1183. Such an observation may equally be true for NEPA as § 102(2)(F) of
the Act showed that Congress could address foreign concerns when it so desired. See 42
U.S.C. § 4332(2).
198. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549, 2552, 2556 (1993).
199. Id. at 2558. Section 243(h)(1) reads, "The Attorney General shall not deport or
return any alien... to a country if the Attorney General determines that such alien's life
or freedom would be threatened in such country on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." Immigration and Nationality
Act § 243(h)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1).
200. Haitian Centers, 113 S. Ct. at 2560.
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ing in Massey. In Haitian Centers, the Second Circuit had stated, "the
presumption against extraterritoriality had 'no relevance in the present
context' because there was no risk that § 243(h), which can be enforced
only in the United States courts against the United States Attorney Gen-
eral, would conflict with the laws of other nations." 0' 1 The Court, reaf-
firming the vitality of the presumption against extraterritoriality and
applying it to the procedural aspects of a statute, noted that "the pre-
sumption has a foundation broader than the desire to avoid the conflict
with the laws of other nations. ' 202 This holding appears to limit the value
of Massey's application to Antarctica and the global commons.
20 3
H. NEPA Coalition of Japan v. Aspin
NEPA Coalition of Japan v. Aspin,2 4 the first extraterritorial applica-
tion case decided post Massey, Smith, and Haitian Centers, explicitly
states the foreign policy exception to NEPA. In NEPA Coalition, plain-
tiffs, a coalition of Japanese citizens and environmental groups, sought a
declaration that the United States Navy had violated NEPA.2 °5 The
NEPA Coalition contended that the Navy's decision not to prepare an
EIS or satisfy "other requirements of the NEPA process" for its activities
connected with United States military bases in Japan evidenced non-com-
pliance.20 6 In an attempt to overcome the Navy's main defense, the pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality, the NEPA Coalition relied upon
Environmental Defense Fund v. Massey,207 asserting that Massey had
201. Id. (quoting Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350, 1358 (2d Cir.
1992)). Compare Environmental Defense Fund v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 533 (D.C. Cir.
1993) ("[S]ince NEPA is designed to regulate conduct occurring within the territory of the
United States, and imposes no substantive requirements which could be interpreted to
govern conduct abroad, the presumption against extraterritoriality does not apply to this
case.").
202. Haitian Centers, 113 S. Ct. at 2560 (quoting Smith v. United'States, 113 S. Ct. 1178,
1183 n.5 (1993)).
203. H.R. 3532, a bill to implement the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the
Antarctic IYeaty would apply NEPA's EIS requirement to Federal activities in Antarctica.
The legislation also authorizes the Administrator of the EPA to promulgate regulations
providing for environmental impact assessment of non-governmental activities. Antarctic
Environmental Protection Act of 1993: Hearings on H.R. 3532 Before the Subcomm. on
Science of the House Committee on Science, Space and Technology, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1994) (Statement of R. Tucker Scully, Director, Office of Ocean Affairs, Department of
State).
204. 837 F. Supp. 466 (D.D.C. 1993).
205. Pls.' 1st Am. Compl. at 5-6, NEPA Coalition of Japan v. Cheney (No. 91-1522),
decided sub nom. NEPA Coalition of Japan v. Aspin, 837 F. Supp. 466 (D.D.C. 1993).
206. Id. at 6.
207. 986 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
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"eviscerate[d]" the presumption against extraterritoriality.2 °8 They based
this argument on the Massey court's holding that the decision making
processes of federal agencies are "uniquely domestic. '' °  Additionally,
the Coalition contended that because it was not seeking injunctive relief
and because compliance with NEPA would not result in any statutory
conflict, none of the foreign policy considerations raised in Massey would
apply.
2 10
At the conclusion of a hearing before the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia, Judge Pratt found NEPA inapplicable and
granted summary judgment for the government.21' The court did not
consider Massey controlling as it determined that "the legal status of
United States bases in Japan [were] not analogous to the status of Ameri-
can research stations in Antarctica., 212 With Massey distinguished, the
court examined the circumstances of the matter before it, keeping in
mind that "[a]ny doubts concerning the extraterritorial application of
statutes must be resolved restrictively., 213 The court found that Depart-
ment of Defense (DOD) operations in Japan were governed by the
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security of 1960,214 as well as the Sta-
tus of Forces Agreement, 215 which provide for mechanisms that address
the concerns of the Coalition. 216 The court concluded that "requiring the
DOD to prepare EISs, . . .would risk intruding upon a long standing
treaty relationship., 217 Because the Coalition was "unable to show that
208. Pls.' Mem. in Reply to Resp. of Defs. to Pls.' Notice of Filing at 1, NEPA Coalition
of Japan v. Aspin, 837 F. Supp. 466 (D.D.C. 1993).
209. Id. at 3.
210. Id. at 4.
211. NEPA Coalition, 837 F. Supp. at 467.
212. Id. The court observed that Massey involved the unique status of Antarctica and
that the Court of Appeals had expressly limited its ruling by refusing to decide whether
NEPA might apply to actions involving a sovereign nation. Id. (citing Environmental De-
fense Fund v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 537 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).
213. Id. (citing Smith v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1178, 1182 (1993)).
214. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, June 21-22, 1960, U.S.-Japan, 11
U.S.T. 1632, 1633-35.
215. Administrative Agreement under Article III of the Security Treaty Between the
U.S. and Japan, Feb. 28, 1952, U.S.-Japan, 3 U.S.T. 3341, 3342-62.
216. NEPA Coalition, 837 F. Supp. at 467. The treaty established a Joint Japanese/
American Committee and calls for fifteen standing subcommittees. Among the subcomit-
tees is the Committee on Environment and Noise Abatement which would have jurisdic-
tion over the type of claims made by the NEPA Coalition. Id.
217. Id. Deputy Secretary of State Clifton R. Wharton stated in his declaration that:
unilateral application of United States legal and regulatory procedures to activi-
ties within ... Japan ... without the prior consent of the Government of Japan,
would impinge on Japanese national sovereignty. This could prove disruptive of
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Congress intended NEPA to apply in situations where there is a substan-
tial likelihood that treaty relations will be affected," the court had no
difficulty in applying the presumption against extraterritoriality.218 The
court also noted that "even if NEPA did apply ... no EISs would be
required because U.S. foreign policy interests outweigh the benefits from
preparing an EIS."219 Finally, the court limited its holding to those cases
in which "clear foreign policy and treaty concerns involving a security
relationship between the United States and a sovereign power" are impli-
cated, leaving for another time the determination of whether NEPA ap-
plies in other contexts.220
III. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS IN THE EXTRATERRITORIAL
APPLICATION OF NEPA
On a number of occasions, members of the House of Representatives
and the Senate have sponsored bills proposing to amend the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969.221 Other bills would require the fed-
eral government to analyze the environmental effect of its actions outside
the United States.222 These bills have called for strict overseas applica-
tion of NEPA. 223 To date none have passed.224 Although NEPA should
local Japanese politics, interfere with existing treaty arrangements, and disrupt
ongoing operations to the detriment of United States relations with Japan.
Decl. of Clifton R. Wharton at 7, NEPA Coalition, 837 F. Supp. 466. Japanese sover-
eignty might be threatened because, "NEPA procedures could require the U.S. Govern-
ment to conduct intrusive inquiries through the collection and assessment of
environmental, economic, and social data from neighboring communities and areas inside
Japan." Furthermore, the Japanese Government would be highly sensitive to such activi-
ties and would regard it as "an inappropriate and impermissible intrusion into Japanese
sovereignty, and inconsistent with U.S. rights under international law and our relevant
bilateral defense agreements." Id. at 8, NEPA Coalition, 837 F. Supp. 466.
218. NEPA Coalition, 837 F. Supp. at 467-68.
219. Id. at 468 (citations omitted).
220. Id.
221. H.R. 3219, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); S. 1278, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); S.
1089, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
222. H.R. 1113, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (CEQ to issue regulations to increase anal-
ysis to address the effects of global warming, ozone depletion, and other worldwide
concerns).
223. The most recent bill introduced by Representative Owens (D-NY) in the height of
the controversy over the North American Free Trade Agreement would have made NEPA
applicable to extraterritorial actions of the federal government. 139 CONG. REc. H7452
(daily ed. Oct. 5, 1993) (statement of Rep. Owens). The bill would amend the environmen-
tal impact section of NEPA as follows:
Section 102 of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. § 4332)
is amended-
(1) by inserting "(a)" before "The Congress authorizes" and
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be modified to make its applicability explicit, the new amendment should
provide for the foreign policy exemption and consideration should be
given to avoid any damage to United States diplomatic initiatives.
A. U.S. Foreign Relations Policy Implications Tending to Defeat
Extraterritorial Application
Administration officials, Republicans and Democrats alike, have con-
tended that extraterritorial application of NEPA would act as a major
constraint on foreign policy.225 Mandatory application of NEPA would,
in fact, affect the ability of the United States to conduct negotiations with
foreign nations226 and complete them in a timely manner.227 A prime
(2) by inserting at the end of the following:
(b)(1) The requirement to include detailed statements undersection
(a)(2)(c) applies to extraterritorial major Federal actions significantly af-
fecting the environment.
(b)(2)(A) The President shall include with each proposal by the Presi-
dent or the Executive Office of the President for legislation to imple-
ment any trade agreement significantly affecting the environment that is
signed after December 16, 1992, a detailed statement in accordance with
the requirements applicable under subsection (a)(2)(C) to an extraterri-
torial major Federal action of an agency.
(B) Any person aggrieved by a failure of the President to comply
with subparagraph (A) may in a civil action obtain an appropriate
relief.
(b)(3) In this subsection, the term extraterritorial major Federal action-
(A) includes any major Federal action in the United States that has
effects outside the United States; and
(B) does not include any Federal action taken to protect the na-
tional security of the United States, votes in international confer-
ences and organizations, actions taken in the course of an armed
conflict, strategic intelligence actions, armament transfers, or judi-
cial or administrative civil or criminal enforcement actions.
H.R. 3219, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
224. Representative Mike Synar, (D-Okla.), for instance, has recognized that NEPA
must be clarified in order to apply it to extraterritorial U.S. actions. However, with the
large number of other environmental statutes up for renewal, he noted that it is not likely
that NEPA will be amended soon. Interview with Mike Synar, Member, House of Repre-
sentatives, in Washington, D.C. (July 18, 1994) (notes on file with author).
225. The chairman of the White House Council on Environmental Quality under Presi-
dent Bush urged that NEPA not be reauthorized because of its potential for interference
with foreign policy. White House Opposes NEPA Reauthorization, Officials Cite Foreign
Policy Constraints, 10 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at 398 (July 17, 1991). The Clinton
Administration also followed this line of reasoning in their appellate brief for Public Citi-
zen v. U.S. Thade Representative, 822 F. Supp. 21 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 685 (1994). Government Asks Appeals Court to Overturn
Impact Statement Decision, 16 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) No. 15, at 544 (July 28, 1993).
226. Use of NEPA would have a deleterious effect on negotiations because of "the need
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example of what could happen if NEPA were applied indiscriminately
can be found in Public Citizen v. U.S. Trade Representative,228 which was
brought, in part, to question U.S. trade policy as a whole.229 In Public
Citizen, Judge Richey of the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia ruled that "the actions of the... Office of the United States
Trade Representative in negotiating, drafting, and signing the [North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) were] subject to review
under... NEPA."230 The court then ordered the government to prepare
an environmental impact statement on NAFTA "with all deliberate
speed." '231 Although the case was eventually decided on other
grounds, 2 the government contended the delay caused by the prepara-
tion of an EIS would undermine the President's commitment to U.S.
trade partners, "resulting in uncertainty expressed by the governments of
Canada and Mexico as well as other trading partners concerning the Pres-
ident's ability to proceed with NAFTA and with the negotiations now
under way on additional agreements to address environmental
concerns."233
Beyond the foreign policy concerns involved in negotiating treaties and
international agreements, unrestricted application of the NEPA to for-
eign actions of the Department of Defense could have a severe impact on
for flexibility, speed, secrecy, and respect in dealing with foreign countries." White House
Opposes NEPA Reauthorization, Officials Cite Foreign Policy Constraints, supra note 225,
at 398.
227. The "submission of international trade agreements [and treaties] could be held up
for years while an EIS was being prepared and its adequacy litigated .... Government
Asks Appeals Court to Overturn Impact Statement Decision, supra note 225, at 544 (quot-
ing amicus brief of the National Assoc. of Manufacturers for Public Citizen v. U.S. Trade
Rep., 822 F. Supp. 21 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
685 (1994)).
228. 822 F. Supp. 21 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
685 (1994).
229. Patty Goldman, the senior litigator, said Public Citizen brought the "case not just
focused on the NAFIA but looking at the way trade policy is developed in a broader
sense." All Things Considered: Appeals Court Requires No NAFTA Environmental State-
ment (Nat'l. Pub. Radio broadcast, Sept. 24, 1993), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
NPR File.
230. Public Citizen, 822 F. Supp. at 30.
231. Id.
232. The decision of the Court of Appeals turned on the fact that the treaty would be
submitted to the Congress by the President, and as such did not constitute final agency
action. See Public Citizen v. U.S. Trade Representative, 5 F.3d 549, 553 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
233. Government Asks Appeals Court to Overturn Impact Statement Decision, supra
note 225, at 544 (July 28, 1993) (citing Brief for the U.S. Trade Representative, Public
Citizen v. U.S. Trade Representative, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (No. 93-5212)).
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national security.2 "4 Although courts have allowed challenges to United
States military domestic actions by its own citizens,23 5 application of
NEPA outside the United States might significantly interfere with U.S.
security relationships involving other foreign nations.23 6 Additionally, in
an application most certainly not anticipated by Congress, foreign indi-
viduals might attempt to utilize NEPA to block U.S. military actions
overseas.
237
Although not strictly related to foreign policy concerns, the extraterri-
torial application of NEPA could have an impact on U.S. relations with
other nations, as NEPA would represent an additional tool for those in-
tent upon blocking manufacturing plant relocations outside the United
States.238 By bringing a lawsuit questioning the sufficiency of the impact
statement, the group opposing the move might be able to delay the plant
relocation until the company lost interest or enough public support had
been built to prevent the move.239
234. Additionally, strict application of NEPA to the open ocean portion of the global
commons could restrain United States Navy operations and readiness.
235. Military actions have been attacked with NEPA's EIS provisions on a number of
occasions. See Friends of the Earth v. U.S. Navy, 841 F.2d 927 (9th Cir. 1988) (attempt to
prevent construction of aircraft carrier home port facility); Concerned About Trident v.
Rumsfield, 555 F.2d 817 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (attempt to prevent the construction of a subma-
rine base in Washington State); Comm'n for Nuclear.Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463
F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (attempt to enjoin underground nuclear test); Greenpeace
U.S.A. v. Stone, 748 F. Supp. 749 (D. Haw. 1990), appeal dismissed as moot, 924 F.2d 175
(9th Cir. 1991) (attempt to enjoin movement and destruction of chemical weapons); People
of Enewetak v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 811 (D. Haw. 1973) (test of strategic defenses).
236. Resp. to Pls.' Notice of Filing at 10-13, NEPA Coalition v. Aspin, 837 F. Supp. 466
(D.D.C. 1993).
237. See generally discussion of NEPA Coalition of Japan v. Aspin, 837 F. Supp. 466
(D.D.C. 1993) supra part II.H; Mayor Will Travel to U.S. to Oppose Military Housing De-
velopment, 11 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 134 (Feb. 10, 1988) (mayor of Zushi City, Japan,
wanted NEPA changed so it applied to all military facilities). Cf Stone, 748 F. Supp. at 754
(attempt by German citizens to prevent the movement of U.S. Army chemical weapons in
the F.R.G.).
238. Cf. Fran Ansley, Standing Rusty and Rolling Empty: Law, Poverty, and America's
Eroding Industrial Base, 81 GEO. L.J. 1757, 1847-51 (1993) (use of environmental claims
inside the United States are discussed as a tool to block plant relocation).
239. A group opposed to U.S. Steel's construction of a steel mill at a greenfield site and
favoring modernization of an existing location was able to delay construction of a new
plant until U.S. Steel abandoned the project. Id. at 1848-51 (citing Lake Erie Alliance for
the Protection of the Coastal Corridor v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 486 F.
Supp. 707, 709 (W.D. Pa. 1980)).
Extraterritorial Application of NEPA
B. Foreign Policy Concerns Tending to Advance Extraterritorial
Application
While there are many reasons for avoiding strict application of NEPA
in an extraterritorial setting, other considerations may dictate that it
should apply in some manner. The strongest case for an extraterritorial
application of NEPA is that the United States is a signatory to the Con-
vention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Con-
text.240 In signing the Convention, the United States pledged to "take the
necessary legal, administrative or other measures to implement the provi-
sions of [the] Convention, including.., the establishment of an environ-
mental impact assessment procedure that permits public participation
and preparation of the environmental impact assessment.., described [in
the Convention]. 2 41 The United States further pledged to issue an im-
pact assessment prior to a decision to authorize, within its jurisdiction,
any of a specified number of actions that are "likely to cause a significant
transboundary impact., 242 In keeping with our responsibilities under in-
ternational law, the United States should take actions to implement the
treaty. One course of action to do so would be to amend NEPA.
IV. CONCLUSION
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 fails to define its inter-
national application. As the law has developed to date, NEPA's EIS re-
quirement will not be applied when there are significant foreign policy
concerns or the United States does not exercise a large degree of control
over the proposed action. Executive Order 12,114 was a welcome addi-
tion in filling the gap, because it mandated that an environmental assess-
ment be completed for actions which have foreign effects. NEPA,
however, should be amended 'to clearly specify the scope of its extraterri-
torial reach. Explicit language from Congress would not only allow the
United States to fulfill its obligations under the Convention on Environ-
mental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, but it may also
help prevent applications that would cause embarrassment to the nation
and damage to its foreign policy. At a minimum, the amended NEPA
should apply to actions in the United States that have consequences be-
240. 30 I.L.M. 800 (1991).
241. Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context,
Feb. 25, 1991, art. 2 para 2, 30 I.L.M. 800, 803.
242. Id. at art 2 para 3, 30 I.L.M. at 804. Appendix I of the Convention specifies a list
of 17 activities that could result in transboundary air or water pollution. Id. at Appendix I.
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yond our borders. Such a provision should, of course, not be applied
merely because the decision making occurred in the United States. Per-
haps a better approach would be to amend the statute to apply extraterri-
torially, while recognizing and providing for all of the foreign policy and
national security interests described in the Executive Order. With these
proposed changes, it may be easier "to create and maintain conditions
under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill




243. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a).
